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Why Isn't Consciousness Real? (3)
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Day 2: Why Are We Zombies? (Continued)

How general 'consciousness' derives from the progressive structure

When Chalmers considers a zombie, he thinks of it as 'my zombie twin'.¹ This is quite symbolic. *My* zombie twin is, in fact, a person who, though identical to me *in all respects*, differs from me only in that he is not me. Only such a person can provide the model for the absence of phenomenal conscious experience. That is, the problem here can only be raised as that of *my* zombie duplicate. This, to begin with, is a crucial point. *Nevertheless*, that very point, contrary to itself, is generalizable to people who are not me. That is why the problem becomes a 'problem' sharable with others, and is actually one now. The moment I think of the problem, another 'I' can be made a starting point for 'thinking' *the same!*

This is what happens when Descartes reaches the conclusion, 'I think, therefore I am', after his trying to doubt everything. The moment he reaches the truth that the existence of *this* doubting 'I' cannot be doubted even by an all-encompassing doubt, that truth transforms into the truth that the existence of *the* doubting 'I' generally cannot be doubted even by an overall doubt. The transformation here is in fact due to the operation of language, and is only a dream produced by language. However, since we live in a world of a dream produced by language, we cannot 'awake' from it.

Thus, when the conception of a general zombie becomes possible, general 'consciousness' is also formed. 'My duplicate who is not me but properly has phenomenal consciousness' becomes conceivable, and, conversely, 'my duplicate who is not me and, independently of that, also lacks phenomenal consciousness' also becomes conceivable. Of course, there is no substantial difference between my non-zombie duplicate and my zombie duplicate. 'Consciousness', which they can have or lack, is not real. It is a highly abstract constructed concept obtained through removing the progressive structure from the contrast between the 'phenomenal' and the 'psychological' illustrated in the diagram on p. 49 of 'Why Isn't Consciousness Real? (2)' (*Philosophia OSAKA*, No. 7, 2012), and taking it as though there is something general called the 'phenomenal'. In that sense, 'consciousness must be functional and psychological from the outset. Thus, the twofoldness in 'my consciousness' of 'my' and

¹ David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

‘consciousness’, which I discussed in the beginning of the first lecture, becomes possible for the first time. That is, it becomes possible that *I have consciousness*.

Once this twofoldness is acknowledged, it becomes a fully possible state of affairs that I actually lack consciousness now. If an authority says, ‘Since your brain is in such-and-such a state, you in fact do not have consciousness’, her utterance could be sufficiently persuasive. This case is not one of a true zombie because there is a difference in the brain state. But the authority’s reason need not be related to the brain. Her reason could be, say, ‘Because you’re a Scorpio’. In a world where Scorpios are conventionally believed to be zombies, I, having been born in November, could live my whole life calling myself a zombie. The obtaining of that possibility means the completion of the formation of the independent concept of consciousness. However, of course, even in the present case, it is possible for me to rebel against the convention on the basis of the awareness that whatever anyone says, *this* consciousness, which I feel, is genuine. This would be the meaning of the ‘Cartesian cogito’. But then, it would have to be allowed that it is possible for any of the Scorpios to be such a rebel! Isn’t allowing the possibility that any of the Scorpios is a rebel tantamount to allowing the possibility that all of the Scorpios are zombies?

Let us turn to the analogy with time that we introduced in the previous lecture. The zombie hypothesis corresponds to the question of whether, say, the present moment at noon on the day before yesterday was really a present moment (at that time). This question might be misunderstood as the same in kind as the question of whether, say, I was really eating that curry in Ochanomizu at that time, which corresponds to an error in my understanding of other minds, rather than a question whether others are zombies. That the present time at noon on the day before yesterday was not a present time should only be read as meaning that at the time in question ‘consciousness’, i.e. consciousness *qua* a reflective act grasping the time itself, did not exist.

How are inverted qualia possible?

How about the so-called ‘inverted qualia’ that Chalmers deals with? The global formulation of the hypothesis would be that it is possible for a world physically identical with our world to contain conscious experiences different from ours (while they do exist). The local formulation would be that it is possible for a person physically identical with me to have conscious experiences different from mine (while they do exist). As Chalmers expresses the idea, where I have a red experience, my inverted twin has a blue experience, which he calls ‘red’.²

² Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, p. 100.

To put it another way, my inverted twin has certain colour experience when he looks at what he and I both call 'red', e.g. a tomato, blood, a sunset, a fire engine, etc. But that colour experience he has is the same as the colour experience *I* have when I look at what we both call 'blue', e.g. the ocean, the sky, etc. According to Chalmers, whereas rearrangement of nervous processes would be necessary in order for such an inversion to happen in the actual world, it is logically possible for two people to have inverted experiences relative to each other when their relevant physical structures are exactly the same.

However, the above argument is entirely wrong. When my inverted twin and I look at what we both call 'red', his colour experience would *ipso facto* have to be the 'same' as my colour experience and would have to be an experience of 'red'. There is no possibility that his experience is the 'same' as a blue experience I have. The point here is the same as that of the aforementioned thesis that 'other people' do not have anything 'of this sort' ('Why Isn't Consciousness Real? (2)', *Philosophia OSAKA*, No. 7, 2012). The question whether the red seen by another person is the same as the red seen by me is a mere piece of nonsense brought about by dealing with 'phenomenal' qualia as though they were ordinary real things and as though they could be compared with each other. Again, another person is another person precisely because it is impossible to deal with qualia in such a way. And it is this very impossibility that makes 'phenomenal' qualia 'phenomenal'.

The reason why it nevertheless erroneously seems possible to make comparisons between the qualia of different people is that I can make comparisons between my own qualia in my own mind (or, at another level, that all people can compare their own qualia in their own mind). If colours seen with the right eye differ from those seen with the left eye, or if there are injuries to both legs, the difference between the colours or pains can be observed. In such a case, therefore, inverted qualia would be possible. Moreover, as we have discussed in the previous lecture, if my qualia become inverted at some point in time, I can know about the inversion through memory. To put it from the opposite point of view, the possibility of knowing it through memory constitutes the temporal unity of the self. Then, because there is nothing corresponding to memory in the case of between another person and me which could bridge the gulf between another person and me, it can be said that the absence here is the essence of another person.

It should never be forgotten that the 'self-other' contrast in the above argument always incorporates the hierarchical difference which has been repeatedly illustrated. The word 'qualia' here means, insofar as it is communicable, 'qualia' *qua* functions, and the word 'phenomenal' already means being 'phenomenal' merely in the sense of having the role of being 'phenomenal' among what are psychological. So, in that sense, even a robot should be able to report, 'Red things began to look blue to me yesterday', or, 'Sour things taste

bitter today'. For this sort of reported situation would be sufficiently possible if a robot had a function of cognizing and recording its cognitive styles independently of its external cognition. The most important point here is that when I report such a situation, I, too, could only communicate what this robot could.

Then, what about genuine phenomenal qualia, which are *not* those that have a role of being 'phenomenal' among what are psychological but are primitively actual? I can ask myself, 'I do have *this*, which is pain (or sourness or anxiety or melancholy), but do others also have the same thing as *this*?' However, others simply *lack* the same thing as *this* (in the same sense as that in which others are simply zombies). That they lack the same thing does not mean that they have something different. There is, in the first place, no foundation for talking of the sameness or difference. So, of course, it is impossible to conceive of a moderate situation where there might be an 'inversion' *if* I could peep into others. Here there is this sort of utterly peculiar gap. To begin with, that is a crucial point.

Despite that point, however, the utterly peculiar gap becomes one that is not peculiar at all. The same was true in the case of zombies. As I have said, when I speak using language, I can only speak of what a robot could speak about. Even I have no genuine or primitively actual qualia. At this level, 'qualia inversion' becomes possible; it becomes possible to conceive of an 'inversion' of what plays the role of 'qualia' among other psychological functions. *If* the function of cognizing and recording cognitive styles independently of external cognition is accessible from the outside, it would be possible for two of such functions to be the same or to be inverted. There is no longer the peculiar gap. Nevertheless, I secretly superimpose the utterly peculiar gap, and relish the philosophical meaning of the inversion.

Jackson's Mary and Nagel's bat

To show that consciousness does not supervene on the physical, Chalmers also employs the so-called knowledge argument in addition to the above arguments. This argument does not seem very important to me, but since it is well-known, I would like to introduce and comment on it.

Frank Jackson told a story about an imaginary person called Mary, which has become famous in philosophy. Because Mary grew up in a black-and-white room, she has only seen white, black and grey colours. But she becomes a world-renowned neurophysiologist who has perfect knowledge of the neural processes associated with colour information processing. Nevertheless, she is yet to know what it is like to see such colours as red and blue. When she steps outside her room for the first time and sees red and blue, she comes to know facts about

the world which she does not know until then. It then follows that facts about the subjective experience of colour vision are not entailed by physical facts. For if they were, Mary could infer from her knowledge what it is like to see red. The conclusion is that physical knowledge is not everything, and therefore that materialism is false.

Chalmers himself offers a counterargument to the above argument by appealing to Churchland's objection, but since his counterargument is not interesting enough, let us consider the following objection: wouldn't it be easy for Mary to physically produce the brain state of seeing red to enable her to see red in the room? The answer would certainly be 'yes'. The point of the objection is that Mary would nevertheless fail to infer the colour from her physical knowledge. When she sees red, she obtains an entirely new kind of knowledge. That is, there is a psychophysical law of the actual world not included in physics. So, the psychophysical relation in question is not a logical supervenience relation but a natural supervenience relation, and there exist things that partly constitute this world apart from physical properties.

Needless to say, I completely disagree with this objection. In the first place, isn't the idea that there are (or aren't) things inexhaustible by physical properties in the world too simple and impoverished? The problem of the existence of consciousness isn't such a cheap problem. It is not a problem as to whether there are two kinds of existences inside one kind of common world. The problem is a far more fundamental one as to the basis for the very conception of one common world. (Unfortunately, this goes beyond the topic of the present lecture series.)

My objection is plain: can't the same story be told even if Mary is a zombie? It should be clear that it can be, for we can understand the point of the thought experiment about Mary, who is *another person*. Even Zombie Mary would have a psychological function positioned as 'phenomenal experience'. *By definition*, it occupies a position not inferable from physical knowledge. Then, if Zombie Mary leaves the room and sees red and blue, she also comes to know facts about the world which she did not know until then. If it follows from this that facts about the subjective experience of colour vision are independent of physical facts, that would be simply because the former facts were given such a position beforehand. And insofar as Mary is 'another person', there is no substantial difference between her being a zombie and her not being a zombie. Indeed, even if I were Mary, I could express no such substantial difference by uttering, 'Now I know what colour is'. What follows is the same as in the case of qualia inversion, so I will not repeat myself here. The point is, in short, that the progressive structure operates here again. Otherwise the case of Mary would be no different from, say, a case where a person who only knows 0 and 1 comes to know 2, 3, 4, etc.

Another big star that ranks with Jackson's Mary is Nagel's bat. Let us discuss it briefly,

for it is also famous. We cannot know what it is like to be a bat. Knowledge of all the physical, biological and physiological facts about bats would still not give us knowledge of what their experience is like. Again, there is a gap here. The reason is that a form of subjectivity far removed from one's own cannot be properly conceptualized. Because our concept of consciousness is framed based on the functional form of human consciousness, a form that significantly differs from it is difficult to imagine. If we understand how bats' brains produce their consciousness, we would understand the form of the function of their consciousness, but would not be able to grasp their phenomenal consciousness itself.

If so, however, wouldn't the same be the case even between bats or between humans after all? A bat would not be able to know what it is like to be another bat. Even a bat could not know what it is generally like to be a bat. But it could know what it is like to be the bat that it is.

Then, if a bat was a brain scientist, it should be able to study the relation between its brain state and its conscious state. Observing its own brain state, it could see that when the brain is in such-and-such a state, its consciousness is in such-and-such a state. What if this bat was a zombie? How could it perceive the brain state that corresponds to the awareness of simultaneity required here? Because the observed brain state is also a conscious state, being tantamount to a brain feeling (that is, a direct feeling of a brain state through introspection), isn't the relation in question a relation between conscious states after all? These questions are all extremely important, but unfortunately we don't have time to discuss them.

The question I would like to particularly raise is this: could this bat, being a brain scientist, know or believe that its subject of study is the mind-body relation? I doubt that it could. For how could it know the fact that the same relation as *this* is occurring in another bat? How could it believe this fact? The bat couldn't know it. The bat couldn't even believe it. Indeed, there is no such fact. In order to know or to believe such a fact – or, more precisely, in order to accept the view that there is such a fact – it is necessary to make a tremendously huge leap. The leap consists in understanding the relation between oneself who observes one's brain and oneself who experiences one's consciousness other than the observation of the brain as the *general* relation between the third-person viewpoint and the first-person viewpoint. It is necessary to cross a huge chasm which is larger than that between the mind and the body. We have already made the leap by language. (That is why the story of Mary can be understood, and must be able to be extended to a story of Zombie Mary.) This enables the formulation of the mind-body problem. However, what has come to be unquestioned and presupposed because of the leap? What do we already presuppose? This is the genuine question that ought to be asked philosophically under the question of the mind-body relation. If it is passed over, everything would be built on sand.

The paradox of phenomenal judgement and the ontological proof of the existence of God

Chalmers' zombie theory is sometimes criticized for entailing epiphenomenalism. According to epiphenomenalism, consciousness only supervenes on physical phenomena, being their effect, and is unable to become a cause that influences the physical progress of the world. This has a rather peculiar consequence in the case of referring to one's own consciousness. Suppose that I actually experience a pain, and say, 'I have a pain'. The reason why I say this is that I actually feel a pain. I simply say what I feel. Now, my zombie duplicate could also say, 'I have a pain'. However, his utterance would not be a report of what he experiences. He experiences nothing. Then his utterance would be explained in terms of the physical processes in his brain which caused it. But if so, my utterance would also have to be explained in the same fashion. For it should be that precisely the same physical processes also occurred in my brain. If they are a sufficient cause for the report, feeling a pain is not necessary. The implication is that the experience itself is not the cause of the utterance, and is causally unnecessary – that it is a mere epiphenomenon.

However, in my view, the problem here is a pseudo-problem that arises because 'to (or not to) actually experience a pain' is substantialized, objectified, and made 'real'. If it is the case that I simply say what I 'feel', then it should also be the case that my zombie duplicate simply says what he 'feels'. For he should also have 'experience'. His and my utterances would be given the same explanation in terms of the physical processes that caused them. There would be no problem. 'Feeling' a pain would never become unnecessary. In both his and my cases, 'experience' itself is the cause of the utterance.

On the other hand, there exists a kind of fact, whether physical or mental, which has no involvement in any causal process. Being present and being me (in the sense illustrated by the top row³) are examples of it. ('Being the actual world' is another example, but it should probably be discussed separately.) However, being present and being me in the general sense (i.e. in the sense illustrated by the rows below the top row) can be incorporated into a causal sequence, and, furthermore, even the present and I on the top row are necessarily repositioned by language and become susceptible to incorporation into a causal sequence. (In the case of the example that should be dealt with separately, this actual world is merely one of the possible worlds which are regarded as 'actual' only in so far as their inhabitants refer to *their own world*.)

Related to this problem is the interesting topic of the 'paradox of phenomenal judgement'. Let us conclude today's lecture by considering it.

³ 'Why Isn't Consciousness Real? (2)', p. 50; p. 56.

As in the example of a ‘pain’ we have just discussed, we become self-aware of our own consciousness, and make a judgement about it. A ‘judgement’ is defined as a ‘purely psychological’ state that is ‘left of a belief after any associated phenomenal quality is subtracted’⁴. A judgement, being psychological rather than phenomenal, can be made even by a zombie. Here Chalmers classifies judgements related to conscious experience into three kinds. First-order judgements are judgements that accompany conscious experiences, such as, ‘This is red’, ‘My leg hurts’, and so on. But, of course, they concern not the experiences themselves but the objects of the experiences. These objects are not consciousness itself, but are normally events or things or their properties in the internal or external world. Second-order judgements are judgements that are not about the object of experience but are directed to the experience itself, such as, ‘I am having a red sensation now’. Third-order judgements are judgements as to consciousness or experience in general, such as, ‘Consciousness is mysterious’, ‘Consciousness is ineffable’, and so on.

Now, whereas experience as such is phenomenal, judgement is psychological, so judgement should be explainable through reduction to physical facts by the ordinary method of cognitive science. This has a puzzling consequence. The following example is from Chalmers, and ‘I’ in it refers to him. Please listen with that in mind. If I say in a conversation, ‘There is nothing more mysterious than consciousness in this world’, my utterance is a behaviour brought about by some cause. The cause of the utterance is a firing of neurons in the brain. So, this process would be the same for a zombie. All that is happening to him would be happening to me, and all the scientific explanations, all the things that are explainable objectively, would equally apply to him and me. That is, consciousness as such is always a mere epiphenomenon that is contingently accompanied, and an explanation of my behaviour can be obtained without relation to my consciousness. My zombie duplicate would talk of the subtle nuances of pain, and also of his favourite colours and tastes. He would challenge a zombie who advocates materialism, claiming that the existence of consciousness is certain, and that it is not reducible to physical properties. All these speech acts can be given an adequate physical explanation. Then, is he making a false claim?

The important fact here is that he judges and believes that there is a fact about himself that he calls ‘consciousness’ apart from functional, psychological facts. Of course, his judgement or belief is not a phenomenal but a psychological fact. This is paradoxical, because it is a judgement, belief, or claim about consciousness. Otherwise there would be nothing wrong in regarding functional explanation at the psychological level as sufficient. There would also be nothing wrong with first-order judgements related to consciousness. For

⁴ Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind*, p. 174.

since they do not directly concern consciousness, but concern some state of the world, the medium of consciousness can be passed over and be left out. However, because the object of second- and third-order judgments is experience itself, there being no experience will have an odd consequence.

I think everyone can already anticipate my response to this problem, so I will not repeat myself here. Yet I would like to emphasize that this 'paradox of phenomenal judgement' leads to a philosophical problem that is more deep-rooted than is generally believed. For example, the paradox is analogous to why the ontological proof of the existence of God, which seems absurd on the face of it, was a critical issue. That is, the claim, 'Because **God** is perfect (or the greatest), the "concept" of God contains *existence*, therefore God *exists*', corresponds to the claim, 'A **zombie** has *phenomenal consciousness* "functionally and psychologically"', therefore a zombie has *phenomenal consciousness*'. If a zombie said that he has 'consciousness', the concept of 'consciousness' would refer only to a functional property, but he himself would persistently insist, 'I am not referring only to a functional property, but am referring to consciousness itself'. For that is precisely the function of the property. The claim that his persistent insistence could never reach consciousness itself corresponds to Gaunilo's and Kant's criticism of the ontological proof (which is to the effect that the concept of God can never reach the existence of God). If so, however, why is it (taken to be) the case that the similar insistence of another ordinary person can reach consciousness? Where is the place for **God** who cannot be reached by way of a concept or function and simply exists? This becomes a problem.

Let us take up Sydney Shoemaker's objection. From the same grounds as Chalmers, Shoemaker draws the opposite conclusion. His argument goes as follows. We judge that we have consciousness. But if zombies were possible, they would make the same judgement, so it would follow that the existence of consciousness is not involved in the formation of the judgement. Then, it would follow that we, in fact, are unable to access our own consciousness, and therefore lack the ability to judge if we are zombies. Shoemaker, using this argument as a *reductio* argument, concludes that zombies are impossible.

The idea is that the ontological proof is wrong because it would also prove the existence of a counterfeit god. But is he really counterfeit? If he is, is there not a possibility that God, who we believe to exist, can only be counterfeit from the outset?

I can interpret another's utterance, 'The existence of consciousness is indeed mysterious', only at the 'psychological' level. For I do not know his or her 'consciousness'. Or rather, it is not that I do not know it. It can be said that I know it, but insofar as I can know it, it can only be 'psychological'. However, what is more important is that when I myself say, 'The existence of consciousness is indeed mysterious', I can communicate my utterance only at

the ‘psychological’ level. I think that the answer to the ‘problem of other minds’ lies just here. That is, if I ask myself, ‘Do others also have *this*?’, the correct answer is, ‘Insofar as that question can have an objective, public meaning, I also do not have *it*’. I myself also do not have a ‘*this*’ that can be communicated. By speaking, I, as it were, kill God and become a zombie. So, the answer to the sceptical question, ‘Are others possibly zombies?’, is no longer, ‘That question could be asked even by a zombie’, but should be, ‘That question, so long as it is understandable, is already a zombie’s question’.

Thus, we are all already zombies. When interacting with people and speaking of our own experience or consciousness, our Gods are all already dead. So it is impossible for there to exist a further person who is a zombie. There cannot be a further zombie among zombie neighbours!

However, if there comes into existence a new definition according to which we, the whole of the zombie community established in the above way, are ‘not zombies’, that is, if a common understanding that we *commonly* have a mysterious thing called ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is created (it being a new dream that language shows us), a further kind of zombie becomes possible. The concept of a zombie here is not incomprehensible at all. For we already know well the contrast between what is not a zombie and what is a zombie. Please do not say, ‘Do you not secretly believe that at least you are not a zombie?’, So long as our question is spoken of in language, there is no longer such an escape route. How could I ‘secretly’ believe it?

But now, one might criticize my discussion here for being far removed from Chalmers’ original question. That is not right. Chalmers, too, is in fact entangled in *this* problem, and struggles there. To the objection, ‘But the belief would still have been formed even if the experience had been absent!’, he responds as follows. ‘In *this* case, I have *evidence* for my belief, namely my immediate acquaintance with experience. In a different case, that evidence is absent.’⁵ He presents the difference here as crucial. To the objection, ‘But your zombie twin would say the same thing!’, he responds as follows. ‘At most this shows that from the *third-person* point of view, my zombie twin and I are identical But it does nothing to imply that from the *first-person* view, I cannot know I am conscious.’⁶

Chalmers’ responses are too naïve. As I have said, my criticism is summed up in the following statement: what you intend to say cannot be said. Presumably I need not repeat the reason why. But I would very much like to stress the fact that I learned this philosophical insight entirely from Wittgenstein. I think that this is what a ‘language game’ is. In any case, it amazes me how quickly Wittgenstein’s philosophy was forgotten in the Anglo-American

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 198.

⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 198-9.

world, where it had been so rampant. Is the democratization of philosophy not making it difficult especially for a truly significant – and ineffably essential – philosophical insight to be handed down? I have this suspicion finding the bizarre ‘naivety’ of Chalmers’ responses.

Discussion

Question: To suppose that persons are physically identical while their conscious states differ, we considered a case in which there is a zombie twin or inverted twin. But it seems much easier to understand a case in which two persons dwell in one human body and simultaneously have two different qualia, or one has consciousness and the other does not.

Answer: I think your case is a case of simultaneous double personality. That case is good because in it the physical basis is numerically identical, so it allows no room for unnecessary worry that the physical bases might actually be slightly different in some way. One body uses one and the same visual organ and brain, and sees the same thing from the same angle. When one person dwelling in that body says, ‘That’s bright red!’, the other person also says, ‘Yes, that’s bright red!’ Yet the colours they see are in fact inverted, or one of them is a zombie who experiences nothing. Isn’t that your supposition? I think it is very interesting. We could use it to consider various things, but the most important point above all is that if one of the persons was me, there would be no substantive difference between the other person’s being a zombie and his simply not being me. Although two persons are acting to compete for the right to use the same body (especially its mouth), this person is me for some reason and the other one is not me for some reason. Compared to the mystery of the existence of this fundamental difference, the supposition of a zombie is rather cheap. For isn’t the other person already substantively a zombie? What exactly is the basis for the existence of the difference here? Is anything added by further supposing that he is a zombie? This question should be asked in the first place.

Question: Do you mean that there is no difference between a zombie and someone who is not a zombie as far as another person is concerned?

Answer: No, as I said, a difference between them turns into a possible one afterwards. But the difference there is in the beginning is not *that* difference. To use the analogy with time, there is distinctly a difference between the present and a point of time that is not the present from the beginning. Everyone knows this. However, this difference is instantly reinterpreted as a difference between a present time that is present in the sense that any picked-out point of time is present, on the one hand, and another point of time, on the other. Precisely the same can be said of the problem of the ‘I’. Since I have presented various explanations, let me give expression to the structure for those familiar with continental

philosophy. That which there is in the beginning is a primitive difference that is equivalent to the (Heideggerian) ‘ontological difference’, but only an image that is equivalent to the (Derridean) ‘trace’ can be left in our linguistic world. In fact, I think it’s necessary that the ontological difference be made into a trace.

Question: I can’t make out such a ‘postmodernish’ expression.

Answer: Let me then use Leibniz’s terms for those familiar with modern philosophy. The most fundamental difference between ‘God’s will’ and ‘God’s intelligence’ transforms into a difference inside God’s intelligence. If you can’t also make this out, please study the history of philosophy, or for a quick approach, read Chapter 2 of my *The Opening: A Philosophy of Actuality!*

Question: You talked of the privacy of consciousness several times. Given that everything is discussed in terms of the analogy with time, does it not follow that there is also temporal privacy of present consciousness?

Answer: No, there is no temporal privacy. For whereas it is impossible to directly feel another’s qualia or to write down one’s qualia in a diary, memory directly reaches one’s qualia in the past. That is, one can retain in memory the very quality of a pain one felt, and recall it. So whereas the fact that another person’s qualia are inverted relative to oneself, even if these two persons exist simultaneously, is never discovered, the fact one’s own qualia are inverted at some point in the past can be known by oneself at present. Wouldn’t the same contrast hold for the case of being a zombie? Whereas another’s being a zombie is never found out, one’s being a zombie at some point in the past could be known by oneself at present. Hence, the claim that memory is linguistic must be wrong. If memory was really linguistic, there would be temporal privacy of present consciousness, and our self now would be a different person relative to our self in the past. Then we would be little more than a zombie after all. For by experiencing phenomenal qualities only at present, we would not be able to retain them. If this happened to be the case, a significant sense of self-identity, a sense of the self’s remaining identical, would be lost. In short, we, as a self, must be *phenomenally* connected to our self in the past. Otherwise an important component of the self’s connectedness would be lost. And in so far as a zombie is a person, this must also apply to a zombie.

Question: I would like to link the case of simultaneous double personality with the case in which colours seen with the right eye and those seen with the left eye differ from each other. Suppose that a person for whom colours seen with the right eye differ from those seen with the left eye one day splits into two persons, a person who sees with the right eye and a person who sees with the left eye. Then could they not say, ‘He and I should be seeing different colours’? Conversely, suppose that in the beginning there is such a state of there

being two persons, who later come to be integrated such that it becomes possible to compare the difference between the colours seen with both eyes. Could the person not say, 'He and I were seeing different colours'? Could we not think that in this case, there comes to be what is equivalent to memory between oneself and another?

Answer: In the first case, the two persons could not say, 'He and I see different colours'. For the colours 'he' sees now cannot be seen by me. And 'I' can also no longer see the colours 'he' was seeing. In the second case, the person could not say, 'He and I were seeing different colours'. For 'I' cannot see the colours that 'he' was seeing. In the first case, all that could be said is, 'When I was able to use both eyes, I saw different colours with each eye'. In the second case, all that could be said is, 'I am seeing different colours with each eye'.

Question: In the discussion of a bat being a brain scientist, you said that it is necessary to make a huge leap and grasp the relation between oneself who observes one's brain and oneself who experiences one's consciousness other than the observation of the brain as the *general* relation between the third-person viewpoint and the first-person viewpoint, and that we have already made that leap by language. Why does language have such tremendous power?

Answer: That is the very question I contemplate. But it is too immense a theme to deal with in this lecture series. Just to give you a hint, my view is not that language has such power, but rather that such power is itself language. Language is power to grasp the world in a personal and tensed way. This establishes the objective world for the first time. The diagrams I have drawn can also be seen as illustrating this.

Question: You have mentioned Wittgenstein a couple of times, criticizing and praising him, and your evaluation of him doesn't seem straightforward. But is this lecture series nevertheless based on Wittgenstein's philosophy?

Answer: The answer is 'yes and no'. Although I have been greatly influenced by Wittgenstein, I am ultimately negative about his philosophy. He says in Section 253 of *Philosophical Investigation*:

I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast and say: "But surely another person can't have THIS pain!"—The answer to this is that one does not define a criterion of identity by emphatic stressing of the word "this". Rather, what the emphasis does is to suggest the case in which we are conversant with such a criterion of identity, but have to be reminded of it.⁷

I think that Wittgenstein's insight is extremely acute, but captures only one side of the matter.

⁷ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (Blackwell Publishing, 2001), p. 77e.

Suppose that I strike myself on the breast and say, ‘No one can know this pain’, and that another person strikes himself on the breast and say, ‘Does that mean that another person can’t have *this* pain?’ The Wittgensteinian answer should be ‘yes’. For the criterion of the identity of pain is given by the individuality of person, and my first utterance is merely one that is based on that criterion. However, this is one side of the matter, and to use the terms I have just used, it is a story that begins after language grasps the world in a personal way, a personal world coming into existence. A linguistic expression of the grasping at the prior stage would be: ‘No, that which another person cannot have is *this* pain, but never *that* pain’. Even if the other person says the same as me again, his utterance would be denied once again – or endlessly. In the first place it would not be admitted that the two are saying ‘the same’. One might think that this is a small problem, but adherence to it would make language impossible. The concepts Chalmers uses, such as ‘consciousness’, ‘experience’, ‘phenomena’, and ‘qualia’, would of course not be possible. However, I (or the person Wittgenstein saw) attempt to speak of this very impossibility of language – or the setback for it. And were this very setback not involved, the concepts should not operate as Chalmers and others intend them to. The problem is precisely the relationship here between the possibility and impossibility of language. It is no good to do without investigating it and introduce a grammatical criterion *from the beginning*.

Question: Heidegger says that ‘death’ which could never be shared with others is the final bond that generates fundamental communality with others. This thesis is often read emotionally, but such a reading probably does not capture what it really means. It seems to me that the reason why death is special is that it points to the level of ‘this’ which transcends the grammatical criterion of identity and cannot be juxtaposed with other things of the same kind, let alone shared. What Heidegger calls ‘Being’ is barely disclosed here. Is it correct to understand the present problem as this kind of problem?

Answer: I do not know much about Heidegger, but I think you are right on that point. In the case of Wittgenstein, the current issue of pain is isomorphic to the problem of ‘solipsism’ in his sense. For instance, the middle Wittgenstein introduces a solipsist who insists that ‘if I’m to be quite frank I must say that I have something which nobody has’ and that ‘[my personal experience] in a most important sense *has no neighbor*’.⁸ Wittgenstein’s reply to him is as follows: ‘But you don’t mean that it *happens* to be alone but that its grammatical position is that of having no neighbor’.⁹ This view is isomorphic to the aforementioned view of the ‘criterion of identity’. But in my view, the ‘grammatical position’ is unstable in nature,

⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”’, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 77, No. 3, 1968, p. 283.

⁹ *ibid.*

and its instability serves as the ground (or hotbed) for Chalmers' philosophical view. There is a profound reason for this, and the problem is not so easy as to be sufficiently treated simply with such a 'therapy'.

Question: In this lecture Chalmers is even said to be 'naïve' eventually, and seems to be used only to be criticized. Is there still a reason to be concerned with his argument?

Answer: There is a problem that cannot be expressed other than by means of criticizing what he says. In that sense, and in that sense alone, what he intends to say can be said. I must add with special emphasis that a philosopher who has said such a kind of thing plainly is very praiseworthy as a philosopher. So 'naïve' is not simply a derogatory word. Unless someone dares to begin to speak of his or her naïve intuition, philosophy will after all be endlessly and futilely complicated by academically competent, studious, and smart people. Unless there is constant importing of completely amateur intuitions from outside academia, philosophy will only become more and more elaborate. There is this paradox: there is no way to do philosophy without having the courage to contend against philosophical academia. Or the paradox is even that there is no way to do philosophy without being prepared to contend against the whole tradition of philosophy. Do you think this contradicts what I said at the end of the lecture? I do not.

(translated by Shogo SHIMIZU)

